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Abstract. This paper overviews the theoretical and empirical research on behavioral biases and their influence in the 
literature. To provide a systematic exposition, we present a unified framework that takes the reader through an original 
taxonomy, based on the reviews of relevant authors in the field. In particular, we establish three broad categories that 
may be distinguished: heuristics and biases; choices, values and frames; and social factors. We then describe the main 
biases within each category, and revise the main theoretical and empirical developments, linking each bias with other 
biases and anomalies that are related to them, according to the literature. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The standard model of rational choice argues that people choose to follow the option that 
maximizes expected utility. However, this ignores the presence of behavioral biases, i.e. the 
tendency to reason in certain ways that can lead to systematic deviations from a standard of 
rationality (Shefrin, 2006). Both psychology and behavioral economics have shown that people 
are vulnerable to biases and use shortcuts in thinking, exhibit biases in decision-making and 
frame their decisions, exhibit preference reversals and struggle to commit with their decisions in 
the past, and they are influenced by others’ behavior. This leads to anomalies and decision 
effects, that is, empirical results that are difficult to rationalize within the paradigm (Khaneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler, 1991).  
This paper surveys the main biases in the behavioral economics and finance, leaving aside 
their behavioral consequences – anomalies, when they refer to market outcomes or competition 
among firms, and decision effects, when they refer to people’s actions - which, given the 
number of them and extensive literature, deserve a separate review. The literature of behavioral 
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biases is so vast and boundless that trying to cover them all in detail would be unfeasible. Thus, 
and in order to make it particularly helpful for non-initiated readers, we contribute in three 
instances. First, we provide an original taxonomy that is based on the reviews of relevant 
authors in the field. We then describe the most significant of those biases, and review the main 
contributions in regards to the theoretical, empirical and experimental developments. The 
impact of the contributions was filtered by their number of citations in the Scopus database. 
Finally, we provide a critical discussion in terms of the biases and anomalies that are linked to 
them, the lines of open debate and research, as well as the policy implications, according to the 
literature. 
The remainder of the article is laid out as follows: Section 2 provides a taxonomy of biases 
classified in three groups; Section 3 reviews the main heuristics and judgmental biases; Section 
4 is dedicated to choices, values and frames; Section 5 surveys the main social factors; finally, 
Section 6 analyzes some policy implications of the biases described. 
 
2. Searching for an inclusive taxonomy of behavioral  
 
Most taxonomies of behavioral biases available use diverse classification rules and different 
names for similar concepts, what makes it difficult to provide an inclusive list satisfying all 
criteria. To circumvent these limitations, we start from some of the reviews provided by the 
founders of the field, including some Nobel Prize winners, to end up blending their views in a 
more inclusive taxonomy. They follow in order. 
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) list heuristics and biases in seven categories: 
representativeness, causality and attribution, covariation and control, overconfidence, 
conservatism, availability, and judgmental biases in risk perception. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) see five major phenomena: framing effects, nonlinear preferences, source dependence, 
risk seeking and loss aversion. Plous (1993) separates perception, memory, and context; 
heuristics and biases; framing; models of decision-making; and social effects. Kahneman and 
Riepe (1998) classify heuristics, errors of preference –loss aversion and prospect theory (PT)- 
and framing. Rabin (1998) distinguishes mild biases (e.g. loss aversion), severe biases in 
judgment under uncertainty (e.g. confirmatory bias) and those implying a radical critique of the 
maximizing utility model (framing effects, preference reversals, and self-control).  
Shiller (2000a) includes PT, regret and cognitive dissonance, mental accounting, 
representativeness, and overconfidence. Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) note three deviations 
from the standard model (bounded rationality, bounded willpower and bounded self-interest). 
Barberis and Thaler (2003) label beliefs (e.g. representativeness) and preferences (PT and 
ambiguity aversion). Camerer and Loewenstein (2004) list probability judgments (e.g. heuristics) 
and preferences (framing, anchoring, loss aversion, reference dependence, preference 
reversals, and hyperbolic discounting). Akerlof and Shiller (2009) note five aspects of animal 
spirits, including feedback mechanisms, attitudes about fairness, and social contagion. 
DellaVigna (2009) separates non-standard preferences, non-standard beliefs, and non-standard 
Peón et al. / European Journal of Government and Economics 6(1), 24-58 
 
26  
decision-making. Finally, recent surveys separate investor beliefs and preferences (Sahi, Arora 
and Dhameja, 2013), sources of judgment and decision biases (Hirshleifer, 2015). 
Following the above, our taxonomy separates three categories: heuristics and judgmental 
biases; choices, values and frames; and social factors. This choice requires some clarification in 
regards to the terminology used. First, we use the generic term behavioral biases –or, simply, 
biases- to refer to any of them, while judgmental biases are a specific type of systematic errors 
that are induced by heuristics. Second, the categories are devised following some authors in 
particular. We initially followed the spirit of Kahneman and Tversky’s work, which distinguishes 
(i) the heuristics that people use and the biases to which they are prone when judging in an 
uncertain context, (ii) the prospect theory, as a model of choice under risk, and loss aversion in 
riskless choice, and (iii) the framing effects (Kahneman, 2003a,b). Then, we merged PT 
(preferences, broadly speaking) and framing in a single category. We do this following Tversky 
and Kahneman (1981), who consider two phases in the choice process –an initial of framing 
and a subsequent of evaluation-, and Barberis and Huang (2009), who suggest framing and 
prospect theory form a natural pair. To name this category, we use the term ‘choices, values 
and frames’ following the classical article of Kahneman and Tversky (1984). Finally, we include 
a third category of social factors, which refer to cultural and social influences on individuals’ 
behavior. Plous (1993), Shefrin (2000), and Hens and Bachmann (2008), among many others, 
advocate for this category. 
 
3. Heuristics and judgmental biases 
 
Heuristics refer to economic shortcuts for information processing, or simple rules that ignore 
information (Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2010). Since information is vast, disperse, 
changes continuously and its gathering is costly, people develop rules of thumb to make 
decisions, what often leads them to make some errors (Shefrin, 2000). Griffin et al. (2012) 
provide a historical overview. In its initial conception, heuristics were restricted to the domain of 
judgment under uncertainty, a scope later broadened (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002) to a 
variety of fields that share a common process of attribute substitution. In other words, “difficult 
judgments are made by substituting conceptually or semantically related assessments that are 
simpler and more readily accessible” (Kahneman and Frederick, 2005: 287).  
 
Open debate 
 
Researchers focus on whether and when people rely on heuristics (e.g. Cokely and Kelley, 
2009) or how accurate they are for predicting uncertain events (e.g. Ortmann et al., 2008). 
However, two contrary views prevail. Authors like Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) argue that 
heuristics are efficient shortcuts for inference, adaptive strategies that evolved in tandem with 
fundamental psychological mechanisms (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002). No rule is assumed 
to be rational per se; what matters is to understand when a given heuristic performs better –a 
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concept named ecological rationality. Contrariwise, other authors identify two cognitive systems, 
reason and intuition, being the latter norm. In these dual-process theories (Kahneman and 
Frederick, 2005), heuristics would be the fast, intuitive, affect-driven and effortless cognitive 
system. Through the process of attribution substitution, a target attribute of the judged object is 
substituted by a heuristic attribute, and since the target and heuristic attributes are different, it 
induces systematic errors in judgment and decision, known as judgmental biases. Currently, the 
debate stands between those who observe a natural tendency to make errors – e.g. Lacetera, 
Pope and Sydnor (2014) show heuristics matter even in markets with easily observed 
information - and those who favor the ecological rationality – e.g. Norman et al. (2014) see that 
encouraging increasing attention to analytical thinking does not improve diagnostic accuracy. 
In Table 1 we collect some relevant heuristics and the judgmental biases associated to them. 
Since both concepts specify how agents form expectations, there are authors who merge them 
in the same category. Nonetheless, most researchers ― e.g. the original approach by Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) ― consider first the heuristics people use, and then the biases they lead 
to. 
 
3.1 Availability heuristic 
 
Availability is an information selection bias where the probability of an event is estimated by the 
ease with which occurrences can be brought to mind (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Due to 
our limited attention, memory and processing capacities, we make decisions based on subsets 
of information that are easily available. The heuristic contributes to judgmental biases such as 
attention anomalies and an overreaction to new information (Hens and Bachmann, 2008), and 
the hindsight bias (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004). 
 
Related judgmental biases 
 
Attention is a scarce resource and our ability to process information limited. An attention bias 
follows if the attributes that catch our attention are not critical, leading to suboptimal choices. 
Memory has a limited capacity, too, so it works by reconstruction. A hindsight bias may result 
as a side-effect: in hindsight we exaggerate what we might have anticipated in foresight 
(Fischhoff, 1982). The availability heuristic contributes to the bias, because events that occurred 
are easier to imagine than counterfactual ones (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004). Classic 
articles include Odean (1999) on the attention bias and the excessive trading in financial 
markets, Barber and Odean (2008) on three indicators of attention for stock investors, and Pan 
and Statman (2010), who suggest that the hindsight bias amplifies regret.  
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Table 1. Heuristics and judgmental biases. 
HEURISTIC JUDGMENTAL BIASES Related concepts Literature 
AVAILABILITY ATTENTION BIAS   Overreaction Availability and overreaction to new info (Hens and Bachmann, 2008) 
    
Earnings announcement 
drift Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003): Attention and earnings drift 
  HINDSIGHT BIAS   
Camerer and Loewenstein (2004): Availability contributes to hindsight 
bias 
REPRESENTATIVENESS LAW OF SMALL NUMBERS Gambler's fallacy   
Tversky & Kahneman (1974): Gambler's fallacy and Law of small 
numbers 
   Hot hand fallacy Momentum and reversals Rabin and Vayanos (2010) 
   Extrapolation bias  
Hens and Bachmann (2008): Extrapolation bias and 
representativeness 
  BASE RATE NEGLECT  Cognitive dissonance Tversky and Kahneman (1982a) 
  ILLUSION OF VALIDITY   Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
  CAUSALITY AND ATTRIBUTION   Kahneman et al. (1982) 
  CONJUNCTION &     Conjunction fallacy firstly considered a consequence of anchoring, 
but of representativeness after Tversky and Kahneman (1983). ANCHORING-AND-
ADJUSTMENT DISJUNCTION FALLACIES   Reference points 
     
Anchoring falls from the heuristics list (Kahneman and Frederick, 
2002) 
AFFECT RISK-AS-FEELINGS     Finucane et al. (2000) 
FAMILIARITY AVERSION TO AMBIGUITY  Status quo bias 
Familiarity, aversion to ambiguity and status quo bias (Ackert et al., 
2005) 
RECOGNITION HEURISTIC   Endowment effect Recognition (Gigerenzer et al., 1991), fluency (Marewski et al., 2010) 
FLUENCY HEURISTIC   Home bias, underdiversif. Seiler et al. (2013): Familiarity and home bias 
  (EXCESSIVE) OPTIMISM   Wishful thinking Barberis and Thaler (2003) 
  OVERCONFIDENCE SELF ATTRIBUTION BIAS Cognitive dissonance 
Moore and Healy (2008) 
Daniel et al. (1998): Self-attribution and cognitive dissonance 
    Under- and overreaction Odean (1998): Overconfidence and under/overreaction 
   CONFIRMATION BIAS Illusion of validity Griffin and Tversky (1992): Illusion of validity and confirmation bias 
   ILLUSION OF CONTROL  Shefrin (2000): Illusion of control and overconfidence 
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Open debate 
 
The clash between the efficient and the inefficient shortcut views stands on whether the 
availability heuristic is useful to assess probability because instances of large classes are better 
recalled, or it leads to decision biases since it is affected by factors other than frequency –e.g. 
imagination, familiarity and salience. Thus, Heath, Larrick and Klayman (1998) argue its effects 
are ubiquitous because of a lack of experience with unusual events. Instead, the efficient 
approach suggests that results like the hindsight bias, rather than a reconstruction of the prior 
judgment, is a by-product of the adaptive process of updating of knowledge after feedback 
(Hoffrage, Hertwing and Gigerenzer, 2000).  
Recent research on the availability heuristic shows its effect on social media (Chou and 
Edge, 2012). The attention bias might explain the post-earnings announcement drift (Hirshleifer 
and Teoh, 2003) and the accruals anomaly (Battalio et al., 2012), though Cready et al. (2014) 
criticize the spurious effects attributable to misclassification of transactions. Recent research on 
the hindsight bias includes theoretical (Roese and Vohs, 2012) and experimental research –
Chelley-Steeley, Kluger and Steeley (2015) obtain positive results, Calvillo (2014) highlights 
individual differences. 
  
3.2 Representativeness heuristic 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) define representativeness as the degree of correspondence 
between an outcome and a model. It implies a tendency to rely on stereotypes, particularly 
when it comes to estimating probabilities (Shleifer, 2000). Hence, the representativeness 
heuristic explains several biases of judgment under uncertainty. We see them next.  
 
Related judgmental biases 
 
One intuition people have about random sampling is the law of small numbers, a tendency to 
exaggerate how closely a small sample will resemble the parent population (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1971). Linked to representativeness after Tversky and Kahneman (1974), it leads to 
a gambler’s fallacy (Rabin, 1998), a belief in the hot hand fallacy (Rabin, 2002), and the 
extrapolation bias (Shefrin, 2000). The gambler’s fallacy is a classic misconception of what 
regression to the mean implies: a belief that random sequences should exhibit systematic 
reversals (Rabin and Vayanos, 2010). Similarly, a hot hand fallacy implies a failure to 
appreciate statistical independence, but involves instead the belief in an excessive persistence 
rather than reversals. Related to that, the extrapolation bias suggests that people bet on 
trends (Shefrin, 2000).  
The lack of expertise in probability assessment is related to two other biases. Prior 
probabilities (base-rate frequencies) play a key role in probability assessment but none on 
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representativeness, implying a base rate neglect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Prendergast 
and Stole (1996) relate it to a cognitive dissonance reduction, where individuals overweight their 
own information. Moreover, a conjunction fallacy appears when people believe the probability 
of a conjunction of two events is greater than that of one of its constituents. Bar-Hillel (1973) set 
an antecedent, though the fallacy is original of Tversky and Kahneman (1982b) and their classic 
Linda experiment. Finally, two additional judgmental biases related to the representativeness 
heuristic are an illusion of validity, when the confidence people have in their predictions 
depends on the degree of representativeness (Einhorn and Hogarth 1978), and causality and 
attribution, when people attempt to infer the causes of the effects observed and incur in errors 
related to salience, availability and representativeness –after attribution theory by Weiner 
(1985).  
 
Open debate 
 
Recent advances in the study of representativeness include a memory-based model of 
probabilistic inference by Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010), and empirical evidence of a Bayesian 
updating failure (Alós-Ferrer and Hügelschäfer, 2012). There is also consistent evidence of 
most judgmental biases in different instances. Thus, Huber, Kirchler and Stöckl (2010) obtain 
experimental evidence of a gambler’s fallacy effect in investment decisions, while Rieger (2012) 
and Erceg and Galic (2014) perform experimental tests of the effects of conjunction and 
disjunction fallacies on markets. Liberali et al. (2012) explore the mechanisms underlying how 
individual differences in numeracy lead to these biases. 
Notwithstanding, a controversial judgmental bias today is the base rate neglect (Gigerenzer, 
1991). First, it seems in contradiction to the widespread belief that judgments are affected by 
stereotypes (Landman and Manis, 1983). Besides, in regards to the efficient shortcuts debate, 
Cosmides and Tooby (1990) rephrased in a frequentist way the questions in the experimental 
research of Tversky and Kahneman (1982a), and found the base-rate fallacy disappeared. A 
recent contribution by Pennycook et al. (2014) offers a mixed interpretation: though base rates 
are indeed neglected, they may be accessible through intuitive reasoning. Other minor sources 
of disagreement include whether men (Suetens and Tyran, 2012) or women (Stöckl et al., 2015) 
are more prone to display a hot hand fallacy. 
 
3.3 Affect heuristic 
 
The list of heuristics changed after the concept of attribution substitution was introduced by 
Kahneman and Frederick (2002). On one hand, anchoring did not fit as a heuristic anymore, as 
it does not work through the substitution of one attribute for another. Ever since, most authors 
(e.g. Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004) label it as an error of preference that derives from the 
existence of reference points (see Section 4). On the other hand, it put the affect heuristic 
(Finucane et al., 2000) on the list. The heuristic is driven by affect, a natural assessment, 
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automatically computed and always accessible, so the basic evaluative attribute (e.g. good/bad, 
like/dislike) is a candidate for substitution in any task that calls for a favorable or unfavorable 
response. 
 
Open debate 
 
Failing to identify the affect heuristic “reflects the narrowly cognitive focus that characterized 
psychology for some decades. There is now compelling evidence that every stimulus evokes an 
affective evaluation” (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002: 55). Affect provides a faster intuition than 
retrieving from memory. Recent contributions include theoretical (Haack, Pfarrer and Scherer, 
2014) and experimental (Pachur and Galesic, 2013; Jaspersen and Aseervatham, 2015). A 
sideline theory is the model of risk-as-feelings (Loewenstein et al., 2001, Slovic et al., 2002), 
an alternative to cognitive theories of choice under risk that emphasizes the role affect plays: 
beliefs about risk would be expressions of emotion that often diverge from cognitive 
assessments. Lupton (2013) further elaborates the theory, arguing that both emotion and risk 
judgments are collectively configured via social and cultural processes. 
 
3.4 Familiarity 
 
Familiarity is the most common name in the literature to refer to a set of emotionally and 
cognitively driven heuristics. On one hand, there is evidence we make decisions based on the 
degree of closeness we feel about different alternatives. Thus, familiarity is related to fear of 
change and the unknown (Cao et al., 2011) and to ambiguity aversion. On the other, the 
recognition (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbölting, 1991), and fluency heuristics (Marewski et 
al., 2010) show that the reasons for familiarity may be cognitive as well.  
 
Heuristics and related judgmental biases 
 
Two processes govern the recognition heuristic, recognition and evaluation. Recognition is 
the capacity to make inferences in cases of limited knowledge (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002: 
75): “If one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, recognition heuristic infers that the 
recognized object has the higher value with respect to the criterion”. Evaluation judges the 
heuristic as ecologically rational whenever the recognition validity for a given criterion is much 
higher than chance. It allows people to benefit from ignorance by making inferences from 
memory and patterns of missing knowledge. In case two alternatives are recognized, the 
fluency heuristic fills the gap: if one alternative is recognized faster than another, the heuristic 
infers the one with the higher value (Schooler and Hertwig, 2005). Schwikert and Curran (2014) 
analyze the memory processes that contribute to the recognition and fluency heuristics. 
Related to familiarity is an aversion to ambiguity (Ackert et al., 2005). If ambiguity is the 
uncertainty about uncertainties (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986), ambiguity aversion describes a 
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preference for known over unknown risks, as shown in the Ellsberg paradox (Thaler, 1983). 
Early papers include Fellner (1961), who introduced decision weights. 
 
Open debate 
 
Recent advances to understand how familiarity and ambiguity aversion operate include 
neurogenetic studies (Chew, Ebstein and Zhong, 2012). They would help explain anomalies 
such as the status quo bias (Ackert et al., 2005), underdiversification (Boyle et al., 2012), and 
their implications on insurance (Alary, Gollier and Treich, 2013) and asset pricing (Füllbrunn, 
Rau and Weitzel, 2014). However, this is an open field of research, as contradictory results 
were obtained. Roca, Hogarth and Maule (2006) show that the status quo bias could lead to 
ambiguity seeking, and Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) specify some conditions for ambiguity 
seeking and avoidance. Etner, Jeleva and Tallon (2012) provide a review on advances in the 
field.  
Regarding recognition, being the most frugal heuristics (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 1999), 
the debate centers around its efficiency: if ignorance is systematically distributed, recognition 
and criterion are correlated and the heuristic leads to efficient results. Schooler and Hertwig 
(2005) suggest a beneficial forgetting, where loss of information aids inference heuristics that 
exploit mnemonic information, while Ortmann et al. (2008) get mixed results when analyzing 
how the heuristic performs in portfolio management. Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011) survey 
the literature. 
 
3.5 Excessive optimism and Overconfidence 
 
Excessive optimism and overconfidence are two of the most relevant heuristic-driven biases. 
However, they are often confounded in the literature. Indeed, overconfidence may refer to 
different concepts, what added more noise to the debate. Optimists overestimate favorable 
outcomes and underestimate unfavorable ones (Shefrin, 2006). Overconfidence, instead, may 
refer to three different concepts (Moore and Healy, 2008): overestimation in estimating our own 
performance; overplacement (better-than-average effect) in estimating our own performance 
relative to others; and overprecision, an excessive precision to estimate future uncertainty, what 
entails a miscalibration of subjective probabilities. 
 
Open debate 
 
Behaviorists suggest it is heuristics and cognitive biases that cause the overconfidence 
phenomenon. However, two alternative views are the Brunswikian or ecological models 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1991), according to which people are good judges of the reliability of their 
knowledge as long as such knowledge is representatively sampled, and Thurstonian or error 
models (Erev, Wallsten and Budescu, 1994), which interpret overconfidence as merely an 
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illusion, created by unrecognized regression. Despite its popularity, the behaviorist interpretation 
does not provide a clear answer on which heuristics or biases drive excessive optimism and 
overconfidence. Some authors suggest they may have evolved under natural selection, while 
others allege drivers such as the illusion of validity (Rabin and Schrag, 1999), the hindsight bias 
(Fischhoff, 1982), and a confirmation bias (Koriat, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980) for 
overconfidence, and affect (Bracha and Brown, 2012), self-attribution bias (Lovallo and 
Kahneman, 2003), as well as wishful thinking and overconfidence itself (Barberis and Thaler, 
2003), for overoptimism.  
Many models in finance use overconfidence to explain over and underreaction (Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998), asset bubbles (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003) and 
excessive trading volume (Odean, 1998). It also helps explain the forward premium puzzle 
(Burnside et al., 2011) and sensation seeking (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009). Research on 
managerial overconfidence is a classic as well, causing excessive business entry (Camerer and 
Lovallo, 1999) and high rates of MandAs (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). 
 
Related judgmental biases 
 
People exhibit a self-attribution bias when they attribute to their ability events that validate 
their actions, while attribute contrary evidence to external noise or sabotage (Bem, 1965). 
Daniel et al. (1998) relates it to cognitive dissonance. A confirmation bias is observed when, 
once formed a strong hypothesis, people pay attention to news that support their views and 
ignore those that contradict them. Griffin and Tversky (1992) link it to the illusion of validity to 
induce overconfidence. Finally, people exhibit an illusion of control when they behave as 
though chance events were subject to their control (Langer, 1975).  
Some anomalies attributed to be consequence of a biased self-attribution are feedback 
effects that may cause over and underreaction (Daniel et al., 1998), and the spread of stories 
that is essential in the formation of speculative bubbles (Shiller, 2003). Recent literature 
includes Libby and Rennekamp (2012) and Troye and Supphellen (2012). Empirical tests on the 
confirmation bias include Duong, Pescetto and Santamaria (2014) on investors’ use of financial 
information. Finally, recent research on the illusion of validity includes Cowley, Briley and Farrell 
(2015). 
 
4. Choices, values and frames 
 
The second group of behavioral biases follows Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1992), who 
consider two phases in the choice process: an initial of framing and a subsequent of evaluation. 
Regarding framing, behaviorists have shown that people do not choose in a comprehensively 
inclusive context as the rational-agent model predicts. In particular, invariance –i.e., the fact that 
preferences are not affected by inconsequential variations in the description of outcomes 
(Kahneman, 2003a)- is violated, since alternative descriptions lead to different choices by only 
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altering the salience of different features. Framing effects include a variety of biases related to 
two classics in the literature: frame dependence and mental accounting (Thaler, 1985). 
In regards to evaluation, we have prospect theory (PT) on one hand (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979), a descriptive theory of choice that explains how individuals evaluate the 
outcomes of risky prospects and choose in consequence. On the other, the empirical evidence 
that people make inconsistent choices in decisions over time led to the literature on 
intertemporal preferences, which started with problems of self-control (Thaler and Shefrin, 
1981). Framing, PT, intertemporal preferences, and the biases related to them are listed in 
Table 2, and reviewed below. 
 
Table 2. Choices: Framing and preferences.  
FRAMING & PREFERENCES 
Related 
Concepts Literature 
Fr
am
in
g 
FRAME DEPENDENCE Narrow framing 
Equity premium 
puzzle 
Barberis and Huang (2007): Narrow 
framing, equity premium puzzle 
  Loss aversion Tversky and Kahneman (1986) 
  Money illusion Kahneman et al. (1986a) 
 Context dependence  Tversky and Simonson (1993) 
 Repeated gambles  Kahneman and Riepe (1998) 
  
Hedonic editing 
    
MENTAL ACCOUNTING House money effect Thaler (1999) 
  
Self-control Thaler and Shefrin (1981) 
  Choice bracketing   Choice bracketing (Read et al. 1999) 
Pr
os
pe
ct
 T
he
or
y REFERENCE DEPENDENCE ANCHORING-AND- 
 
Anchoring not heuristic, related to 
reference points (Rabin, 1998) 
 
ADJUSTMENT Conservatism  Conservatism: Chan et al. (1996) 
LOSS AVERSION Myopic loss aversion  Benartzi and Thaler (1995) 
DIMINISHING 
SENSITIVITY Risk seeking 
Aversion to a sure 
loss Shefrin (2006) 
  Favorite longshot 
bias 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
In
te
rt
em
po
ra
l 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
s         
PREFERENCE 
REVERSALS  Projection bias 
Projection bias: Loewenstein et al. 
(2003) 
 Self control Precommitment Self-control: Loewenstein (1996) 
 
Hyperbolic 
discounting 
Present bias Frederick et al. (2002) 
 
 
4.1 Frame dependence 
 
Framing, defined as a decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes and contingencies 
associated with a particular choice (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), may produce predictable 
shifts of preference when the problem is framed differently ― a result known as frame 
dependence. A basic principle is the passive acceptance of the formulation given (Rabin, 1998). 
Framing influences loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity – see PT below. Thus, a frame that 
highlights losses makes a choice less attractive, while if it makes them small relative to the 
scales involved it exploits diminishing sensitivity, making the choice attractive (Tversky and 
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Kahneman, 1986). Besides, related to frame dependence are the concepts of narrow framing, 
context effects, repeated gambles and hedonic editing. We see them next. 
 
Related concepts 
 
Narrow framing (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993) is the tendency to analyze problems in a 
specific context without reflection of broader considerations (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003), such 
as evaluating risks in isolation, apart from others they already face (Barberis and Huang, 2009). 
Context dependence (Tversky and Simonson, 1993) appears when an individual’s preferences 
among options depend on which other options are in the set (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004), 
in a way that adding or subtracting options in a menu may affect the choice. The literature 
review of Rooderkerk, van Heerde and Bijmolt (2011) observes a robust evidence of three types 
of context effects. Kahneman and Riepe (1998) show that most people do not distinguish 
between one-time choices and repeated gambles, setting the same cash-equivalent in both 
cases despite the fact that statistical aggregation reduce the relative risk of a series of gambles. 
Benartzi and Thaler (1999) relate the bias to myopic loss aversion.  
 
Open debate 
 
Recent articles include lab experiments (Schlüter and Vollan, 2015) as well as field research 
(Hossain and List, 2012), both with positive results. However, Cason and Plott (2014) identify 
four aspects that contribute to the tension between standard preference theory and the theory of 
framing. Some asset pricing models incorporate narrow framing, such as Barberis and Huang 
(2009) and De Giorgi and Legg (2012). In addition, it help explain market anomalies such as the 
equity premium puzzle (Barberis and Huang, 2007). Finally, Cornelissen and Werner (2014) 
reviews framing in the management literature. 
Evidence of choice effects includes empirical (Hu and Li, 2011) and experimental research 
(Carlsson and Martinsson, 2008). In addition, Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2012, 2013) 
analyze the effects of salience in context-dependent consumer choice and choice under risk. 
Finally, regarding repeated gambles, Liu and Colman (2009) compare them with ambiguity 
aversion, and Lejarraga and Gonzalez (2011) observe that decision makers neglect descriptive 
information when they can learn from experience. 
 
4.2 Mental accounting 
 
Closely related to framing, mental accounting refers to the implicit methods that individuals use 
to code and evaluate transactions, keeping track of and evaluating them like financial 
accounting in firms (Thaler, 2008). Statman (1999: 19) puts it briefly that people think “some 
money is retirement money, some is fun money, some is college education money, and some is 
vacation money”. Thaler (1985, 1999) explains people engage in mental accounting activities in 
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three instances: how outcomes are perceived and decisions are made, how activities are 
assigned to specific accounts, and the frequency with which accounts are evaluated. 
 
Related concepts 
 
Related to both frame dependence and mental accounting, hedonic editing refers to the 
evidence that people code combinations of events in a way it makes them happier (Thaler, 
1999). Thaler and Johnson (1990) provided a theory. Choice bracketing refers to the grouping 
of individual choices into sets (Read, Loewenstein and Rabin, 1999). Narrow bracketing leads to 
myopic risk seeking (Haisley, Mostafa and Loewenstein, 2008) and myopic loss aversion 
(Hardin and Looney, 2012).  
 
Open debate 
 
Positive empirical results of mental accounting include consumption, when it is temporally 
separated from purchase (Shafir and Thaler, 2006), and experimental evidence about inventory 
decisions (Chen, Kök and Tong, 2013). Models based on the mental accounting principle 
include the behavioral portfolio theory (Shefrin and Statman, 2000; Das et al., 2010). Pan and 
Statman (2010) obtain empirical evidence of risk attitude changing across mental accounts of 
growth and value investments. Finally, recent research includes Sul, Kim and Choi (2013), who 
compare hedonic editing to subjective well-being, and Koch and Nafzinger (2016), who develop 
a model of endogenous bracketing where people set either narrow or broad bracketing to tackle 
self-control problems. 
 
4.3 Prospect theory 
 
Prospect theory is the best known descriptive theory of decision-making under risk. For a 
closest insight in such an extensive literature we recommend Barberis (2013). In short, 
according to PT, individuals evaluate the outcomes of risky prospects through a value function, 
where the carriers of value are changes in wealth compared to a reference point rather than 
final assets, and a probability weighting function, where probabilities are replaced by decision 
weights –in accordance with the empirical fact that people tend to put much weight on rare 
events. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) developed an extended version, cumulative prospect theory. 
It accounts for a fourfold pattern of risk attitudes confirmed by experimental evidence: people 
tend to exhibit risk aversion for gains but risk seeking for losses of high probability, and risk 
seeking for gains but risk aversion for losses of low probability. In addition, a value function that 
is steeper for losses than for gains implies loss aversion. Thus, three features are essential: 
reference dependence (the carriers of value are gains and losses defined relative to a reference 
point), loss aversion (the value function is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain) 
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and diminishing sensitivity (the marginal value of both gains and losses decreases with their 
size). This results in a value function that is kinked at the reference point, concave above and 
convex below, and represents investor’s loss aversion. Moreover, diminishing sensitivity applies 
to the weighting function as well. These three features are analyzed separately in what follows. 
 
4.3.1 Reference dependence 
 
In PT, it is not final states what carries utility and matters for choice, but changes relative to a 
reference point. Reference dependence is closely related to diminishing sensitivity and loss 
aversion, and induces two classic behavioral biases, namely, anchoring and conservatism. 
 
Related concepts 
 
Anchoring-and-adjustment is a key judgmental bias in risk perception. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974: 1128) first described it as “people make estimates by starting from an initial 
value that is adjusted to yield the final answer”, an adjustment that is often insufficient. 
Anchoring and reference dependence help to explain decision effects such as the classic status 
quo bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Besides, conservatism, defined as the slow updating 
of models in face of new evidence (Shleifer, 2000), explains why markets often respond 
gradually to new information, what might explain the profitability of momentum strategies (Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996). 
 
Open debate 
 
Though there is extensive evidence that perception is reference dependent, the debate 
continues in different instances. First, in terms of how reference points are set. Common 
candidates include the buying price in stock markets (Shefrin and Statman, 1985) and the 
subject’s rational expectations given the economic environment (Kõszegi and Rabin, 2006). 
However, Koop and Johnson (2012) provide experimental evidence of multiple reference points 
in risky decision-making, and Schmidt and Zank (2012) provide a model of endogenous 
reference points. Second, reference points may change over time, following gains and losses. 
Arkes et al. (2008) observe an asymmetric adaptation that suggests hedonic editing: the 
magnitude of the adaptation is significantly greater following a gain than after a loss of 
equivalent size. Baucells, Weber and Welfens (2011) find reference points are not recursive, in 
the sense that the new one is not a combination of the previous one and the new information. 
Arkes et al. (2010) analyze how cultural differences influence reference point adaptation.  
The debate on anchoring is even better. A first wave of research, which assumed that the 
reference point was given in the formulation of the problem, is over (Epley and Gilovich (2010). 
Epley and Gilovich (2001, 2006) found anchoring effects for self-generated anchors, hence a 
second wave of research searched the psychological mechanisms that produce them. 
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Frederick, Kahneman and Mochon (2010) provide a theory. Finally, a third wave makes 
predictions on the consequences of anchoring. Furnham and Boo (2011) provide a review. 
Regarding conservatism, recent research relates return predictability in stock markets to GAAP 
conservatism principle (Ball, Kothari and Nikolaev, 2013). 
 
4.3.2 Loss aversion 
 
Subjects assign more significance to losses than to gains with respect to the reference point. 
This asymmetry in the value function implies loss aversion: people suffer a loss more acutely 
than they enjoy a gain of the same magnitude. However, this represents a contradiction to 
rational choice, because the basic property of expected utility theory that two indifference curves 
never intersect no longer holds (Knetsch, 1989). The influence of loss aversion in choices is 
observed in different contexts (see Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005), and it may explain 
empirical findings like the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985) and why consumers 
and managers may take fewer risks (Rabin, 2000).  
 
Related concepts 
 
The combination of loss aversion and the investors’ common habit of evaluating their portfolios 
frequently is known as myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). Thaler et al. (1997) 
provided empirical evidence. Langer and Weber (2005) extend the concept to myopic prospect 
theory: when myopic loss aversion combines with diminishing sensitivity and probability 
weighting, the effect of myopia might increase the willingness to invest. 
 
Open debate 
 
There is plenty of literature, including Kahneman and Tversky’s research, exposing the impact 
of loss aversion. Moreover, Cesarini et al.(2012) show loss aversion is moderately heritable. 
However, some limits were identified. Three examples follow. First, exchange goods given up 
as intended, like money paid in purchases, do not exhibit loss aversion (Novemsky and 
Kahneman, 2005). Second, there is mixed evidence of loss aversion on feelings, because 
judging feelings does not necessarily require comparison (McGraw et al., 2010). Third, Polman 
(2012) shows loss aversion is lessened when we choose for others. Finally, regarding myopic 
loss aversion, Gneezy, Kapteyn and Potters (2003) provide experimental evidence, and Fellner 
and Sutter (2009) discuss debiasing techniques. 
 
4.3.3 Diminishing sensitivity 
 
Marginal effects in perceived well-being are greater for changes close to the reference level 
than for changes further away (Rabin 1998). This third essential feature of prospect theory 
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applies to both the value and weighting functions. Noting diminishing sensitivity is a pervasive 
pattern of human perception, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) conjectured the value function 
would be concave for gains and convex for losses –the latter implying risk seeking to avoid 
losses. Regarding the weighting function, diminishing sensitivity entails that the impact of a 
given change in probability diminishes with its distance from two natural boundaries, certainty 
and impossibility, the endpoints of the scale (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Consequently, 
risk-seeking choices are observed in two instances: the aversion to a sure loss, which stems 
from the shape of the value function, and the favorite-longshot bias –a miscalibration of 
probabilities often related to the weighting function. 
 
Related concepts 
 
The aversion to a sure loss is a risk-seeking choice in the negative domain. Most people are 
risk averse, but only when confronted with the expectation of a financial gain. Instead, when 
facing the possibility of losing money, they behave as risk lovers, choosing to accept an 
actuarially unfair risk in an attempt to avoid a sure loss (Shefrin, 2006). The favorite-longshot 
bias is commonly observed in betting markets. Bettors put too much weight on rare events 
(longshot bets) and underestimate the probability of favorites, making the expected return on 
longshot bets systematically lower than on favorite bets (Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2007).  
 
Open debate 
 
The favorite-longshot bias is one of the most studied biases. Firstly documented in horse-race 
betting (Griffith, 1949), recent studies include derivatives markets (Hodges, Tompkins and 
Ziemba, 2008), prediction markets (Page and Clemen, 2013), and sports (Lahvicka, 2014). The 
debate centers around its rationale, including misestimation of probabilities, informational 
asymmetries (Shin, 1992), and limited arbitrage (Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2007). Regarding the 
aversion to a sure loss, researchers are more focused on its interpretation. Adam and Kroll 
(2012) suggest decision makers perceive lotteries as dynamic processes where emotions may 
lead to attraction to chance, while Schwager and Rothermund (2013) provide evidence on the 
effects of framing and attention bias. 
 
4.4 Preference reversals 
 
Intertemporal preferences are rational if they are time consistent. However, empirical evidence 
shows people do exhibit reversals, have problems to commit with decisions they took in the 
past, and exhibit present-biased preferences. We see these concepts together under the 
epigraph of preference reversals, which include problems of self-control, and a present bias in 
intertemporal decision-making. 
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Related concepts 
 
Standard models compare preferences over time with exponential discounting, implying time 
consistency and 100% short-term patience. However, there is evidence that people exhibit a 
present bias or hyperbolic discounting, as preferences typically reverse with changes in 
delay (Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995). Related to such reversals is a projection bias: people 
exaggerate the degree to which their future tastes will be similar to their current ones, what 
makes them save less than originally planned as time passes (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and 
Rabin, 2003). Self-control (and precommitment) relates to that, as being aware in advance 
that our preferences may change, we sometimes make certain decisions to restrict our own 
future flexibility (Loewenstein, 1996).  
 
Open debate 
 
A classic review by Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghe (2002) observes cross-study 
differences in discount rates, against the assumption of a single rate under exponential 
discounting. However, the debate continues today. Andersen et al. (2008) showed that a joint 
estimation of risk and time preferences is required, so the discounting anomalies previously 
observed had to be re-tested. Andersen et al. (2014) find no evidence favorable to hyperbolic 
discounting. Recent advances include a model of preference reversals  (Tsetsos, Chater and 
Usher 2012), and the work of Stevens (2016), who suggests people do not discount, rather they 
compare within attributes (amounts and delays). Recent research includes Zeisberger, Vrecko 
and Langer (2015) about the projection bias, and on self-control an experimental research by 
Burger, Charness and Lynham (2011) and an interpretation of the cash-credit co-holding puzzle 
(Gatherwood and Weber, 2014). 
 
5. Social factors 
 
The last category compiles the items that refer to the impact of cultural and social factors on 
individual’s behavior. This is the least developed and structured body of literature in the 
behavioral economics and finance, but according to Hirshleifer (2015: 133): “the time has come 
to move beyond behavioral finance to social finance, which studies the structure of social 
interactions, how financial ideas spread and evolve, and how social processes affect financial 
outcomes.”. The social factors are shown in Table 3 and reviewed below. 
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Table 3.  Social factors. 
SOCIAL FACTORS 
Related 
Concepts Literature 
GLOBAL CULTURE Cultural differences   
Guiso et al. (2006); Statman and Weng 
(2010) 
SOCIAL CONTAGION 
Obediency to 
authority Herd behavior 
Social contagion: Asch (1952). Herding: 
Shiller (2000b) 
  
Communal 
reinforcement 
& Groupthink 
(Collective) 
Confirmation bias 
Shiller (1984); Janis (1972) 
Shefrin and Cervellati (2011) 
STATUS, SOCIAL 
COMPARISON 
 
Self esteem, Pride, 
Prejudice Rabin (1998) 
   
Cooperation, 
altruism   
FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE   Kahneman et al. (1986a,b) 
GREED AND FEAR 
 
Familiarity 
Fear of the unknown and familiarity bias 
(Cao et al., 2011) 
   
Status quo bias Fear of change and status quo bias 
(Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) 
INFORMATIONAL CASCADES 
Availability 
cascades Asset bubbles Shiller (2002b): Cascades and bubbles 
   Herding Bikhchandani et al (1998): Cascades and 
herding 
 
 
5.1 Global culture 
 
Culture is the values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit across generations 
(Statman and Weng, 2010). Shiller (2000a) notices the emergence of a global culture in a 
convergence of fashions across countries separated by physical and language barriers, and 
suggests these cultural factors help explain the dot-com bubble. Stulz and Williamson (2003) 
claim culture may affect finance through the country values, institutions, and how resources are 
allocated.  
 
Related social factors 
 
Though a global culture might be emerging, cultural differences are also ubiquitous. The best 
studied case is perhaps the differences between East Asians and Americans. Thus, East Asians 
exhibit a broader perceptual and conceptual view of the world and live in more complex social 
networks (Nisbett and Masuda, 2003), and they exhibit different patterns in terms of 
overconfidence and the disposition effect (Chen et al., 2007). 
 
Open debate 
 
Culture has had a significant influence on social psychology (e.g. Miller, 1984), but economists 
were reluctant to use it as an explanatory factor because of the vague and ubiquitous ways it 
can enter the economic discourse, making it difficult to design testable hypotheses (Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales, 2006). Recent techniques and data made it possible to identify 
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systematic differences in people’s beliefs, and relate them to their cultural legacy (e.g. Levinson 
and Peng, 2007). Some authors have analyzed how it affects expectations and preferences. 
These include Henrich et al. (2001) on variations across tribes in the ultimatum and dictator 
games, and Hoff and Priyanka (2004) who show the effects of social inequality linger: beliefs 
that are the legacy of extreme inequality for generations determine individual’s expectations that 
reproduce the inequality. 
Studies on cultural differences in economic and financial variables include Statman and 
Weng (2010), who find different borrowing and investing patterns of immigrants long after they 
settled in their new countries, and Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010), who show that the degree of 
cultural distance between two countries affects foreign asset allocations. Recent literature 
analyzes the effects on corporate structure (Bloom, Sadun and van Reenen, 2015), innovation 
rates (Taylor and Wilson, 2012), and corporate MandAs (Ahern, Daminelli and Fracassi, 2015). 
 
5.2 Social contagion 
 
Research on cultural differences focuses on inherited, slow-moving components of societies, 
while social interaction focuses on peer group effects that can be viewed as the fast-moving 
component of culture (Guiso et al., 2006). The antecedents in the study of social contagion are 
the experiment of Sherif (1937) on the autokinetic effect, and the classic experiments of Asch 
(1952). 
 
Related social factors 
 
A classic in the literature is obedience to authority. The experiments of Milgram (1963) 
showed few people have the initiative to resist authority, to the point of performing acts that 
violate their deepest moral beliefs. Years before, Festinger (1957) analyzed the effects of forced 
compliance, showing that a person forced to do something contrary to her opinion may change 
her view in order to avoid cognitive dissonance. Communal reinforcement is a type of social 
dynamics related to social learning and the psychology of individual suggestibility (Katona, 
1901). Shiller (1984) gives the example of investors who follow gurus, read magazines, discuss 
investments with other investors... and through this process, market psychology influences 
markets. Groupthink is the tendency of cohesive groups to reach consensus without offering, 
seeking or considering alternative hypotheses (Lunenburg, 2010). Janis (1972) identifies some 
symptoms, like an excessive risk-taking, and members imposing themselves a self-censorship 
to avoid appearing as a dissenter. Shefrin and Cervellati (2011) interpret it as a form of 
collective confirmation bias.  
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Open debate 
 
Likewise other social factors, there is an increasing interest in the recent decades for the study 
of social contagion. Nonetheless, the literature review by Manski (2000) suggests that the 
neoclassical view, where non-market interactions are not of interest, ended by the 1970s with 
the adoption of non-cooperative dynamic game theory. Recent contributions include empirical 
research by Rapp et al. (2013), and experimental studies on viral marketing (Aral and Walker, 
2014). In regards to obedience to authority and social contagion, there are two opposite views. 
The classic one highlights the negative impact they have in financial markets, like herding and 
asset bubbles (e.g. Shiller, 2000b). Contrariwise, Ent and Baumeister (2014) observe that 
obedience to legitimate authority may be positive, encouraging individuals to set aside their 
selfish desires for the good of the group. Recent research includes Mayo-Wilson, Zollman and 
Danks (2012) on individual and group rationality, and the model by Nofsinger (2012) on asset 
bubbles fueled by groupthink. 
 
5.3 Status, envy and social comparison 
 
A field of social psychology relevant to economics is the self-perception compared to others, 
and the feelings of jealousy, self-esteem, pride and prejudice such comparison provokes. We 
denote this category status, envy and social comparisons following Rabin (1998). Not all 
feelings stemming from social comparisons are negative, as cooperation (Argyle, 1991) and 
reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) may be included here. 
 
Open debate 
 
Early literature already suggested that social comparison occurs in many forms of human 
interaction, including social status (Ball and Eckel, 1998), reciprocity and altruism (Gilbert, Price 
and Allan, 1995), and consumer dissatisfaction, when they compare themselves with the 
idealized advertising images (Richins, 1991). More recently, researchers have focused on 
testing, whether in the lab or in the field, motivations and effects of social comparison and 
cooperative behavior. These include experimental tests of the effects of social status (Ball et al., 
2001), and the motivations for pro-social behavior (Carpenter and Myers, 2010). 
 
5.4 Fairness and justice 
 
Fairness and justice were recurrently absent from standard economic theory, a striking contrast 
when compared to other social sciences (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986b). We first find 
fairness in the literature of efficiency wages, as well as in the literature of customer markets 
(Okun, 1981). Three reasons related to fairness why people are willing to spend money are in 
order to punish others who have harmed them, to reward those who have helped, or to make 
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outcomes fairer (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004). Fairness and justice are related to 
behavioral effects like money illusion (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986a) and helps to 
determine people’s reference prices (Thaler, 1985). 
 
Open debate 
 
The classic approach to trace evidence of decisions based on fairness and justice analysis is 
using dictator and ultimatum games (Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982). Camerer and 
Thaler (1995) provide a review on ultimatum games and List (2007) on dictator games. 
Researchers focus on topics like moral values (Sen, 1995), equity and competition (Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000), perceptions of fairness (Nguyen and Klaus, 2013), and inequality and 
preferences for redistribution (Durante, Putterman and van der Weele, 2014). 
 
5.5 Greed and fear 
 
Being emotional factors, greed and fear might indeed be related to the affect heuristic in Section 
3. However, we opt to classify them as social factors because these biases tend to appear when 
individuals interact with each other. Two related biases are fear of the unknown, an explanation 
for the familiarity heuristic (Cao et al., 2011), and fear of change, a possible explanation for the 
status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988).   
 
Open debate 
 
The effects of greed and fear are particularly pervasive in financial markets, where they are 
alleged to play a key role in concepts like market sentiment, bubbles and crashes, and others. 
Indeed, Shefrin (2000) identifies human emotions as determinants of risk tolerance and portfolio 
choice. Pan and Statman (2010) show risk tolerance varies with test conditions and the 
emotions associated to them. Lo, Repin and Steenbarger (2005) offer experimental evidence of 
a negative correlation between successful trading and emotional reactivity. Despite these 
results, the effects of emotions over market efficiency are far from being widely accepted. For 
instance, Shleifer (2004) asserts that the unethical behavior blamed to stem from greed is often 
a consequence of market competition. Recent research on greed and fear includes Lee and 
Andrade (2011), who show social projection explains why fear leads to early sell-off in a stock 
market simulation, and Cohn et al.(2015), who provide experimental evidence that fear may play 
an important role in countercyclical risk aversion. 
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5.6 Informational cascades 
 
We learn by observing what others do, and then we imitate them. Imitation would be an 
evolutionary adaptation for survival, allowing individuals to take advantage of the hard-won 
information of others. Significant market events only occur if large groups of people think the 
same, and news media might act as precipitators of attention cascades and the spread of ideas. 
Some phenomena such as herding, fads, asset bubbles and crashes might be consequence of 
informational cascades (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1998). 
 
Related social factors 
 
Availability cascades are self-reinforcing processes of collective belief formation that have a 
combination of informational and reputational motives as driving factors (Kuran and Sunstein, 
1999). By the availability heuristic, people judge the importance of a theme according to their 
ability to remember examples of it. Then, as a chain reaction result, the more people talk about 
an issue the more relevant it seems due to its rising availability in public discourse, leading to a 
self-reinforcing cycle (Hirshleifer, 2008). 
 
Open debate 
 
A line of research today in process focuses on theoretical modeling of the disruptive or 
corrective nature of informational cascades. For instance, Wu (2015) suggests that the 
probability of wrong cascades decreases if laymen are among a group of experts, while the 
model of Rubin (2014) suggests that cascades inducing larger shocks are more likely to happen 
in regimes with centralized coercive power.  
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
The impact of behavioral biases in financial and consumer markets has many implications for 
the way in which these markets work. However, there is no consensus on how to address this 
issue from a public policy intervention perspective. There are three basic approaches –namely, 
debiasing techniques, liberal paternalism, and active policy-making- and all of them have 
supporters and detractors. 
The logic behind debiasing is, if people make biased decisions (positive economics) from 
what is standard rationality (normative economics), perhaps we may help them to choose better. 
Croskerry, Singhal and Mamede (2013) provide a recent discussion on several approaches 
towards debiasing. The idea itself makes no sense for some authors, either under the 
interpretation of the ecological rationality of the heuristics (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011), 
or the contrary: when the limitations of the normative model have become so obvious, it is 
nonsense to insist upon changing humanity to conform to it (Frankfurter, McGoun and Allen, 
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2004). Others advocate for improving financial literacy (e.g. Altman, 2012), while for other 
authors there is evidence that learning and expertise may do little to eliminate biases (Rabin, 
1998) or even might exacerbate errors (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). In any case, debiasing would 
require intervention, since there are many reasons to doubt individuals can debias themselves 
(Kahneman, 2003b). Two approaches are trying to increase motivation to perform well, and 
setting strategies that are closer to normative standards –known as prescriptive decision 
making.  
Liberal paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003) is a smoother approach for prescriptive 
debiasing. It criticizes the assumption that people always make choices that are in their best 
interest, and explores different methods to help consumers and investors improving their 
decision making and enhance their well-being (see Ratner et al., 2008). While being 
paternalistic in the sense that it seeks to help people make better choices, it is liberal in the 
sense that it also respects freedom of choice. For such purpose, it exploits the passive 
acceptance of the formulation given (e.g. the status quo bias) or it uses some behavioral traits 
by the decision maker to reduce other biases –for instance, mental accounting and framing to 
mitigate self-control problems (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). 
Although behavioral biases may affect consumer decisions or lead to anticompetitive 
behavior by firms, some authors discredit paternalism and oppose public intervention.  Cooper 
and Kovacic (2012) provide a model that depicts how greater state intervention, especially if 
oriented to correct firm biases, is likely to lead regulators to adopt policies closer to the 
preferences of political overseers, either intentionally, or accidentally (due to bounded 
rationality). The same interpretation would follow in financial markets. Behaviorists such as 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2002) observe that the same psychological biases that affect 
investors would affect regulators. Rather than correcting market pricing errors, for which they do 
not have a competitive advantage, they advocate for regulators establishing ex ante rules to 
improve efficiency, such as default-option-setting regulations. 
To conclude, some examples of recent literature of behavioral biases and policy implications 
follow in order. Briley, Shrum and Wyer (2013) analyze representativeness and its effect on 
public policy. Some theoretical models interpret excessive optimism as a key factor behind 
credit booms (e.g. Peón, Antelo and Calvo, 2015), and observe a similar bias in governments’ 
official forecasts (Frankel and Schreger, 2013). Givoni et al. (2013) offer a heuristic framework 
to improve the effectiveness of policy interventions. The empirical analysis of Hossain and List 
(2012) suggests some alternatives to increase productivity in factories through simple framing 
manipulations, while Bao et al. (2015) draw policy lessons from mental accounting: authorities 
often overestimate the traffic of high tolled roads because travelers with low out-of-pocket travel 
budget perceive a much higher cost. Finally, research on social factors includes the effects of 
culture on innovation rates (Taylor and Wilson, 2012) and of social contagion: Pacheco (2012) 
models how public opinion influences policy diffusion. Besides, altruism and volunteering may 
be negatively affected by public policies: Ariely, Bracha and Meier (2009) show that extrinsic 
incentives can reduce charitable donations and volunteering as they dilute the signaling value of 
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pro-social behavior. Finally, Shleifer (2004) observes ethics and efficiency go together when 
ethical norms promote cooperative behavior, helping for the successful functioning of social 
institutions.  
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